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I. Introduction
The development and enforcement of adequate laws and administrative provisions in
connection with the prevention, investigation and prosecution of all areas of financial
crime are clearly of crucial importance at the present time. Particularly acute difficulties,
however, arise with regard to the prohibition and prevention of the use of the new global
financial markets for the purpose of money laundering.
Although this has been a matter of increasing concern in a number of countries for
some time, the problems associated with money laundering have recently become of par-
ticular importance at the international level with the explosive growth in the size and com-
plexity of global financial markets over the last two decades and the corresponding oppor-
tunities created for their abuse.2 It is essential that effective national and global solutions
are developed in early course.
The continued stability of the new world economy clearly depends upon the safe and
effective operations of national and international financial markets. This order could,
1. Fellow in European Banking and Finance Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen
Mary and Westfield College, University of London. Assistant Director of the London Institute
of International Banking, Finance and Development Law. Solicitor in Scotland, England and
Wales and Member of the NewYork Bar.
2. See, for example, Group of 7 [G7] Financial Action Task Force [FATF], Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering Report, (June 1990); United Nations, Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, signed in Vienna, Austria, on 20
December 1988, UN Doc E/Conf 82/15 (1989) 28 International Legal Materials (ILF) 493,
Misc 14 (1989) CM 804; Basle Banking Supervision Committee, Prevention of Criminal Use of
the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (December 1988); Commonwealth
Heads of Government, Communiques, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, (October 18-24, 1989) and Harare, Zimbabwe, (October 16-22, 1991);
General Assembly of Interpol, Anti-Money Laundering Resolution (October 18, 1995), noted in
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network [FinCEN],Interpol
Adopts Anti-Money Laundering Resolution, October 24, 1995. With regard to European initia-
tives, see section 3 infra. For more recent discussion, see FATF, Annual Report 1994-1995
(summary reproduced in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Financial Markets,
"Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering: Annual Report 1994-1995" No. 62, pg.
37, ISSN 0378-651X). See also, Fourth International Conference on Money Laundering,
Forfeiture, Asset Recovery, Offshore Investments, the Pacific Rim and International Financial
Crimes, Conference Papers, February 1996; for comment see, Douglas Barnes, "USA spreads
banking tyranny world-wide" available on LEXIS/NEXIS.
Summer 1996 171
however, be unsettled by either extensive money laundering operations being carried out
on the legitimate markets involved or by the development of underground banking mar-
kets or secondary currency markets.3 Again, apart form any regulatory or monetary argu-
ments involved, 4 it is also even more essential from the perspective that organized crime
should not be allowed to protect and then benefit from its illicit gains.
It is accordingly essential that complete and effective solutions are developed in early
course to eliminate all forms of money laundering in national and international markets.
With regard to Latin America, in particular, the International Narcotics Control Board
[INCB] in Vienna has recently stated that South America and Central America are
amongst the areas currently most vulnerable to money laundering abuse along with Asia,
Russia and the Caribbean. 5 While the prevention of money laundering presents a chal-
lenge to all developed and developing counties, particularly serious issues arise with regard
to such fragile or vulnerable economies as they can easily come under the economic and
political pressure , or even control, of criminal groups if criminally .defined capital has free
access into their economies especially as such capital has a strong potential for exacerbat-
ing corruption in both the government and private sector. The weak banking and financial
structures of most countries in Central America also make them prime targets for money
laundering activities.
The INCB Report also notes that drug trafficking is so pervasive that it has triggered
money laundering operations on a global scale and that the amount of money involved
has now assumed such proportions that it is capable of destabilizing global financial mar-
kets. In addition to drug trafficking, however, it is essential that all types of market abuse
are eliminated to prevent the laundering of all forms of criminally derived funds from
whatever source.
3. See, for example, Wilmer Parker III, Black/Parallel Markets: When is a Money Exchanger a
Money Launderer? 12 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 423 (1995). In connection with the recent crisis in
Brazil's illegal parallel currency market see, Alexandre Carrerni, Interview - Brazil Seeks Stable
Real on Illegal Market Reuter April 29, 1996.
4. In connection with the damage caused in Latin America by drugs trafficking and money
laundering in terms of inflation and higher living and housing costs and related loss see gen-
erally, Latin America: War on Drugs is Being Lost Bishops Warn, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 9,
1993; and Amelia Obregon, Cocaine Riches No Help to Columbia, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1992,
at Al, A13.
5. International Narcotics Control Board Report, 1995; for comment, see Thalif Deen, United
Nations: Drug Profits Outstrip National Wealth, INTER PRESS SERVICE, February 28 1996. For
comment on the particularly serious developments taking place within Russia see, Prepared
Testimony of Ariel Cohen, Senior Analyst and Salvatori Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies,
the Heritage Foundation, Before the House International Affairs Committee, Crime and
Corruption in Russia and the New Independent States: Threats to Markets, Democracy and
International Security, ( Jan 31, 1996); see also, Lena Starostenkova, Financial Problems of the
Russian Economy (Wall St J. Europe Jan 27-28, 1996); Press Conference with Robert Gelbard,
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Regarding
the Results of His Visit to Russia (Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Nov 14, 1995); and
Prepared Statement of R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, Before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, World Threat Assessment Brief sec III (Jan 10, 1995).
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As the difficulties created by money laundering operations are clearly global in nature
and effect, coordinated international or, at least, regional responses as well as effective
national implementation programmes must be developed in early course.6
At the regional or multinational level, the two most important models which have
been adopted to date are the 1992 Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offences
Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offences [the OAS Model Regulations] 7
and the 1991 European Council Directive on Money Laundering. 8 The OAS Model
Regulations had been prepared over a two year period by the Inter-America Drug Abuse
Control Commission [the CICAD] under the auspices of the Organisation of American
States [OAS].9 These two sets of regional models, however, do not have any direct legal
effect and must still be implemented by all participating states in the laws of each of their
respective countries.1 0 For this reason, appropriate national or local models must also be
considered, the two most developed are currently those of the United States and the
United Kingdom.
6. For general comment on recent international developments see, Bruce Zagaris and Shelia
Catisilla, Constructing an International Enforcement Subregime: The Implementation of Anti-
Money Laundering Policy 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, IV and V; and Phyllis Solomon, Are Money
Launderers All Washed Up In The Western Hemisphere? The OAS Model Regulations 17
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 433 (994), at III and IV. See also, Bruce Zagaris and
Constantine Papavizas, Using the Organisation of the American States to Control International
Narcotics Trafficking and Money Laundering 57 Revue Internationale De Droit 119 (1986) and
Bruce Zagaris and Elizabeth Kingma, Asset Forfeiture International and Foreign Law: An
Emerging Regime 5 EMORY INT'L L.REv. 445 (1991).
7. See, Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offences Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking
and related Offences, OAS/Ler.I/XIV.2, CICAD/INF.58/92 (July 9,1992). For comment, see
infra section 3,
8. Council Directive 91/308 OJ 1991 L 166/77. See infra section 4.2.
9. The CICAD was established as an autonomous regional organisation within the OAS pursuant
to an OAS conference on drug trafficking in Rio de Janeiro, April 22-26 1986, OEA/Ser.
K/XXXI. 1, CICAD/1986. See infra section 3.
10. The difference between the two sets of regional measures is that the OAS member sates are
placed under no obligation to implement the Model Regulations in their national laws while
the European Directive is addressed to all Member States and must be implemented under
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome. For comment on the distinction between soft law and hard
law in the money laundering area, see Zagaris and Papavizas, supra note 5, at 452.
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While a number of Latin American countries have taken a significant amount of
action to control money laundering, at least, in relation to drug related criminal activities,
few comprehensive responses have been adopted to date with only very limited action hav-
ing been taken in many areas.11
For those Latin American countries which have not yet adopted any controls in this
area or are considering developing their existing basic provisions into more comprehen-
sive codes, the most relevant national model may remain that of the United States.
Although the very substantial public and industry reporting, investigation and enforce-
ment costs involved make it inherently unsuitable as an initial implementation model for
use in less developed economies. Of more value in creating both a control and cost effec-
tive local response to the difficulties created may be the programme of measures adopted
within the United Kingdom to implement the provisions contained in the European
Money Laundering Directive. Whether a United States or United Kingdom model is used,
it is imperative that an effective set of measures is adopted early in all countries to deal
with the very serious difficulties which arise in combating money laundering in the
global financial markets of the 1990s. Following a short note on the nature and size of
11. Ecuador adopted comprehensive money laundering controls including amendment of its
bank secrecy laws in 1990; see Zagaris and Catisilla, supra note 5, at 922-925. Uruguay has also
begun to take action in this area especially since 1993. id., at 922-926. Although a large
amount of action has been taken in a number of Latin American countries this has often not
followed the OAS Model Regulations; see, Solomon, supra note 5, and note 97. For comment
on the measures adopted, in particular, in Venezuela in 1993, which had be that time become
the new money laundering capital of Latin America, see Victoria Colliver, Venezuelan Law
Aims to Dent Drug Business, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 20, 1993,2. Mexico has most recently
become the most improtant centre for the intial placement of U.S. drug cash into the world's
financial system with only very limited action having been taken to limit abuse due to the
enormous profits earned by the Mexican banking system; see U.S. State Department views on
laundering in select countries' ALERT INTERNATIONAL, April, 1996. An extended package of mea-
sures has, however, susbsequently been agreed between the United States and Mexico; see
Daniel Dombey, News: The Americas: Mexico-US Accords Made, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, May 9,
1996, at 11. Although Columbia had been making progress against illegal drug trafficking it
has since been removed from the list of countries maintianed under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (as amended) which will result in economic sanctions being imposed including the
withdrawal of foreign aid and lending privilege; see Nancy Dunne and Sarita Kendall,
Columbia faces US sanctions over failure to combat drug trafficking, THE FINANCIAL TIMES,
March 2, 1996, at 3. Bolivia and Peru were, however, added to apporved list under Presidential
Determination No. 96-13 of March 1, Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 48; FR 9891; see infra notes
24 and 175. Chile made money laundering a criminal offence in 1994 and Argentina has very
recently introduced new reporting requirements to control money laundering abuses; see
Argentina Introduces Money-Laundering Controls, Reuters, May 16, 1996. For a general review
of recent developments in Latin America, see Lee Brown, Director, National Drug Control
Policy, The Drug Czar Discusses His Recent Trip to Latin America, News Conference (August 29,
1995) available on LEXIS; see also, Remarks of Treasury Secretary Robert E Rubin on the
Buenos Aires Money Laundering Conference and Argentina/Brazil Trip, to the Carnegie
Endowment for Democracy, Brookings Institution and Inter-American Dialogue (Dec 7,
1995); and International narcotics control efforts in Western Hemisphere, US Dept. Of State
Dispatch, Vol. 6, no. 16, (April 17, 1995).
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the current global problem, the purpose of this article is to note the general content of the
OAS Model Regulations and then to contrast these with a more detailed review of the
nature and effectiveness of the the alternative adoption models currently available for
Latin American development.
II. Nature and Scope of Problem
A. MONEY LAUNDERING OPERATIONS
Money laundering is concerned with the recycling of criminally derived funds
through normal financial system operations with a view to making the funds available for
future legitimate (or illegitimate) use while, at the same time, disguising their true source
to protect them from seizure or forfeiture and the parties involved from criminal or civil
prosecution.
The Financial Task Force on Money Laundering [FATF], which was established by the
Group of 7 leading industrialised countries in 1989 to examine the flow of illegal money
and of money laundering methods, 12 agreed as its working definition, that money laun-
dering consisted of either the conversion or transfer of property, the concealment or dis-
guise of its true nature or source or the acquisition, possession or use of property knowing
it to be criminally derived.13
Following an examination of how money laundering was effected in practice, FATF
stated that money laundering involved three general stages of operation, namely, place-
ment, layering and integration of the funds. While placement involved the physical dispos-
12. See, G7 Economic Declaration of 16 July 1989 and 1990 Report, supra note 2. After a seven
month study, the final Report was issued in April 1990 which contained a 40-point pro-
gramme to deal with money laundering and asset forfeiture on a global basis. The Report also
contained detailed annexes which examined money laundering operations in each of the 15
participating countries involved and the statutory and regulatory responses adopted to date.
The study undertaken by a group of 130 experts from the countries involved focused, in par-
ticular, on the extent and nature of the money laundering process, the analysis of the national
laws and regulations of each of the countries involved and a compilation and review of the
existing international instruments and agreements relevant to money laundering. For com-
ment see, CHARLES INTRIAGO, International Money Laundering (1991), Ch 3.2; and Lisa Barbot,
Money Laundering: An International Challenge, TULANE J. OF INT'L & CoME. LAW 163 [19941.
The commitment of the G7 to control global money laundering was most recently restated at
its Halifax, Nova Scotia Summit in October 1995; see World money laundering control effort
given new impetus, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Oct. 1995.
13. The FATF defined money laundering as follows:
1. The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from a crim-
inal offence, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade
the legal consequences of his actions;
2 The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement,
rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from a
criminal offence, and
3. The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that such
property was derived from a criminal offence or from an act of participation in such offence.
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al of bulk cash proceeds from their location of acquisition to avoid attention 14 layering was
the separation of illicit proceeds from their source through the use of complex financial
transactions to disguise their audit trail.15 Integration then involved the conversion of the
proceeds into apparently legitimate business earnings through normal financial or com-
mercial operations in the real economy.16
It is clear from the FATF analysis that money laundering operations can take many
complex forms and that it is accordingly not possible to adopt a simple definition or crim-
inal sanction-based response. A more comprehensive but integrated programme of mea-
sures must accordingly be developed which involves a wide variety of civil, criminal and
administrative sanctions and penalties. In addition, the establishment and maintenance of
effective internal investigation and reporting procedures on the part of all of the financial
institutions concerned must also be required.
B. CRIMINAL VALUE
In terms of the growth in the size of the money laundering problem, it was estimated
in 1990 that the revenues generated from global drug trafficking were in excess of US$300
billion of which US$100 billion, at least, was from trafficking activities in the United
States. 17 The Department of Justice estimated that the figure was potentially as high as 2%
of the gross national product [GNP] in the United States which was larger than the entire
US automobile market. 18
By 1993, it was estimated that world-wide profits from organised crime stood at US$1
trillion1 9 which compared with an aggregate total profit figure of the top fifty Fortune 500
companies in the United States of US$33.923 billion. 20
By 1995, it was estimated by United States federal law enforcement officials that
between US$100 billion and US$300 billion was laundered in the United States alone each
14. Examples include, structuring of cash transactions to avoid currency reporting laws, the com-
plicity of individual bank personnel, correspondent banks or even central bank deposits and
the creation of false paper trails through the use of false documentation.
15. Layering may involve the conversion of cash into other monetary instruments, such as trav-
eller's cheques, letters of credit, money orders, cashiers cheques, or bonds and stocks, the sale
or conversion of material assets purchased with the proceeds or electronic fund transfers with
all of the advantages of speed, distance, anonymity and lack of audit transparency involved.
16. The FATF noted the following examples of integration: real estate acquisitions, front compa-
nies and sham loans, foreign bank complicity and the use of false import or export invoices.
17. See, citing Carl Florez and Bernadette Boyce, Laundering Drug Money, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL.,. Apr. 1990, at 22-23. Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating
a New Federal Offensive or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of
Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity? AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REvIEw 823 [1995].
18. Ibid. The GNP of the United States is around $6.2 trillion; see, infra note 17.
19. See Michael Elliot, et al., The Global Mafia, Newsweek, Dec. 13, 1993, at 22 (citing Roy J.
Godson of the National Strategy Information Centre), quoted in Mattew B. Comstock, GATT
and GATS: A Public Morals Attack on Money Laundering, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 139 (1994).
20. See Joseph Pivinski, et al., The Fortune 500: The Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE,
April 18, 1994, at 220; see, Comstock, supra note 18.
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year.2 1 The Secretary-General of the International Police Organisation in Paris [Interpol]
also stated in 1995 that global drug trafficking alone may be worth as much as US$400 bil-
lion a year which was the second most lucrative business in the world after the arm's trade
which generated US$800 billion annually. Only a few countries in the world had GNP fig-
ures in excess of this amount with almost all developing and newly industrialised countries
being well below this figure.22 Even these estimates may now be inaccurate with the total
figure possibly being as high as US$500 billion.23
Even if these figures still appear relatively insignificant against an estimated total glob-
al market for financial services of US$50 trillion, 24 the money laundering figures alone
only take into account of the amount actually cleared each year and not the value of the
total amount of cash or assets which have been successfully laundered to date and are still
available for use by organised criminal organisations or networks.
The true size of the problems created by the continued failure to deal with the difficul-
ties which arise in connection with money laundering can only be understood in terms of
the long term value of laundering channels to criminal operations in the protection and
consolidation of criminal wealth.
Although the problem has also historically not been understood to be as serious in
Europe and the United Kingdom, following the recent action taken by the Clinton
Administration under Presidential Decision Directive 42 it is now expected that much of
the US$300 billion laundered in the United States will flow over the next year from the
United States into the London and European financial markets. 25
21. See United States General Accounting Office, Money Laundering - Needed Improvements For
Reporting Suspicious Transactions Are Planned, Report to the Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
May 1995, p 2.
22. See Deen, supra note 4. The countries with GNP in excess of $400 trillion include the United
States ($6.2 trillion), Japan ($4.2 trillion), Germany ($1.4 trillion), France ($1.2 trillion), the
United Kingdom ($819 billion) and China ($425 billion).
23. See, Prepared Statement by Edward W, Kelly, Jr., Member of Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services (Feb 28,
1996).
24. Under the interim arrangements, agreed in Brussels on 26 July, but without the full support of
the United States, 90% of world financial services, in more than 90 countries, will be covered
by the new trade liberalisation measures which will last until the end of 1997. This market is
estimated to be worth $20,000bn in terms of world banking assets and a further $20,000bn of
deposits, $10,000bn of world stock market capitalisation, $10,000bn of listed bonds and
$2,000bn of world insurance premiums; for an initial report see, FINANCIAL TiMEs, July 27
1995, p 6; and World Trade Organisation, WTO Director-General Hails Financial Services
Accord Press Release 18, July 26, 1995.
25. For comment on Presidential Decision Directive No. 42, see David Ignatious, Caught in the
Drug War Crossfire; Banks, Citizens Could be Casualties of Clinton Plan to Freeze Assets, The
Washington Post, November 5 1995, and James Adams, £200bn heads for London markers, The
Sunday Times, November 19, 1995. See also, Ronald K. Noble, Under Secretary of the Treasury
for Enforcement, Address to the American Bar Association's Money Laundering Enforcement
Seminar, Washington (November 2, 1995). See infra section 6.
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III. The OAS Model Regulations
The OAS Model Regulations were adopted at the Twenty Second General Assembly of
the OAS26 in the Bahamas on 23 May 1992 following two years of work by a series of
national experts working under the CICAD.27 The programme had initially been set up in
1990 by the CICAD to develop a model money laundering law which was based on the
Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 28 but revised to ensure that it could be adopted and applied by all participat-
ing states.29 Although none of the countries involved were obliged to adopt the Model
Regulations, a series of regional conferences were established to encourage enactment of
appropriate national laws. 30
As the Model Regulations were based on the Vienna Convention they are only applied
to the laundering of the proceeds from illicit drug trafficking with money laundering
being defined as the transfer of proceeds from the trafficking of narcotics or related
26. The OAS was established in Bogota in 1948 to solve legal problems common to its member
states. See Charter of the Organisation of American States, T.I.A.S. No. 2361. The Charter
came into force on December 13, 1951. For a restatement of the commitment of the OAS to
the control of drugs trafficking and money laundering see Combating the Problem of Illegal
Drugs and Related Crimes, Summit of the Americas, Plan of Action, section 1.6 (reprinted in
NAFTA: REV, Dec (1995), at 166-193). For recent comment by Robert E. Rubin, Treasury
Secretary, on the importance of the work of the OAS in the combating of money laundering
see, Diana I. Gregg, Rubin Says Ministers of the Americas Need to Move Growth, Reform Forward
BNA International Business & Finance Daily, May 17, 1996.
27. See Solomon, supra note 5, at 446.
28. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, signed in
Vienna,-Austria, on 20 December 1988, UN Doc E/Conf 82/15 (1989) 28 International Legal
Materials 493, Misc 14 (1989) CM 804. See infra section 4.1.
29. Following the establishment of the initial programme by the CICAD, a Declaration and
Programme of Action was issued by the OAS General Assembly at Ixtapa in 1990 which
declared drug trafficking a crime against humanity and agreed to devote resources to elimi-
nate it. An agreement was then signed by delegates from 32 of the member states approving
this intent and a working group of representatives set up to draft appropriate rules. The draft-
ing of the provisional rules followed an examination of the existing laws and practices in each
of the relevant territories to ensure that the proposed draft provisions were prepared as a pos-
sible model for use or adoption by all countries and not simply based on the laws of a single
state; see Solomon, supra note, at 445-446. The draft regulations were considered on January
24, 1992 at a conference in San Jose, Costa Rica after two years of preparation with representa-
tives in attendance from Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica,
Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. At the final session in Punta
del Este, Uruguay in March 1992 additional representatives attended on behalf of Antigua and
Barbuda, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay. Nineteen anti-drug recommendations
were made which were subsequently adopted as the OAS Model Regulations by the OAS
General Assembly on May 23, 1992. Id.
30. See supra note 10.
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offences).3 1 Any person who converts, transfers, acquires, possesses or uses property know-
ing that it was derived from illicit trafficking or any related offence shall be guilty of a
criminal offence. 32 Courts of OAS member states are to have jurisdiction in all cases where
an offence has been committed irrespective of where the drug trafficking actually
occurred, although this is without prejudice to any rights of extradition.33 Although these
provisions are significant, the scope of the OAS rules are considerably more limited than
those of the European Directive both in terms of the types of criminal activities and finan-
cial institutions covered. 34
The Regulations also provide for the imposition of freezing and seizure orders prior to
conviction and for the forfeiture of property and any proceeds related to the offence fol-
lowing conviction subject to the rights of bona fide third parties. 35
Financial institutions are defined to include all publicly or privately owned banking or
related financial institutions, although this does not include insurance undertakings.3 6
Under the Regulations, financial institutions must not maintain anonymous accounts or
accounts in fictitious or incorrect names and must verify and record identifying informa-
tion of all clients. Records must be kept for at least five years.37 All information must also be
made available to relevant competent authorities on request, while information must not
otherwise be exchanged with any other persons nor anyone notified that an information
request has been made. The Regulations also provide for a specific disapplication of any rel-
evant bank secrecy laws in the event of a valid information request having being made. 38
In connection with cash transactions over a certain size, the Regulations only impose
a requirement to record all relevant transactions, rather than a full reporting obligation.
Although this is extended to include multiple transactions, but only if the employees, offi-
cers or agents involved have actual knowledge of the connected nature of the transactions
concerned. 39 In place of the full reporting obligation on all transactions over a certain
size, the Regulations adopt a separate suspicious transaction requirement which is extend-
ed to include a careful examination of all complex, unusual or large transactions. 40
A programme of sufficiently penal sanctions must be adopted in respect of all viola-
tions with financial institutions being vicariously liable for the acts of their directors,
employees and owners. Specific criminal penalties are also imposed for wilful breach of the
31. OAS Model Regulations, art 1.
32. Id. art. 2.
33. Id. art. 3.
34. See infra section 4.2(b) and (c).
35. OAS Model Regulations, arts 4, 5 and 6.
36. The Regulations apply to all commercial banks, trust companies, savings and loan associa-
tions, building and loan associations, savings banks, industrial banks, credit unions and any
other institution or establishment authorised to do business under domestic banking laws
whether publicly or privately owned. Ic. art 6.
37. Id. art. 10.
38. Id. art. 11.
39. Id. art. 12.
40. Id. art. 13. This also applies to all unusual patterns of transactions as well as to insignificant
but periodic transactions which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose. This provision
clearly corresponds with the extension of the recording obligator to include all multiple trans-
action.
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prohibition on secret accounts and the suspicious reporting requirements.4 1 Financial
institutions must establish appropriate internal programmes to ensure the ethical conduct
of their employees and full compliance with the terms of the Regulations.
42
Although the OAS Model Regulations are important insofar as they establish a set of
common provisions which are based on the Vienna Convention but adjusted to reflect the
existing laws and practices of all of the participating territories, they suffer from a number
of important limitations. The most significant single defect, however, is the non-obligatory
nature of the Regulations. It is essential that all of the participating territories adopt appro-
priate measures, especially in Latin American, and very unfortunate indeed that more
implementation progress has not been possible.
With regard to the scope of the Regulations, serious difficulties arise in that they are
only applied to drug connected trafficking activities and only to bank related financial
institutions. 43 In light of the increasing global and integrated nature of all financial mar-
kets, it is essential that money laundering of all forms of criminal proceeds are covered and
that the relevant rules are applied to all types of financial institutions including banks,
securities firms and insurance undertakings.44
Information is also only exchanged in response to specific requests from other mem-
ber sates of the OAS. A more comprehensive system of mutual exchange of information
would dearly be more appropriate between all OAS countries which should also be sup-
plemented and operated with information sharing arrangements with other non-OAS ter-
ritories under suitable bilateral or multilateral arrangements. 45
To facilitate the receipt of information by the relevant authorities from reporting
institutions and the exchange of information between authorities, efficient computer and
telecommunications networks will have to be established in all of the countries involved.
Although this will create no difficulties in the more developed member states of the OAS,
serious information gathering, processing and transfering difficulties will arise in other less
developed participating countries which will dearly undermine the effectiveness of the
operations set up in each territory as well as the overall effect of the system of controls
adopted within the OAS.
With regard to internal compliance programmes, although the Regulations require
that appropriate programmes should be established, no further assistance is provided in
connection with the nature or content of such programmes. The effective operation of all
financial institutions' internal customer identification, record keeping and reporting sys-
tems is ultimately the most important control on the prohibition of money laundering
activities in all countries. It is absolutely essential that appropriate and effective systems are
established and maintained by all financial institutions.46
41. Id. art. 14.
42. Id. art. 15.
43. For comment on the content of the Regulations see, Model Regulations, Recommendations of
the Group of Experts to CICAD (Solomon, supra note 5, and note 128.)
44. Contrast infra section 4.2(b) and (c).
45. For recent comment on the need to develop specialised financial information units within the
OAS area, see Robert E. Rubin, supra note 25.
46. See infra section 5.3 and note 170.
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A number of other objections may also be raised with regard to the use of specific
United States' legal concepts in drafting the Regulations, the possible use or inclusion of
appropriate incentive structures, the imposition of more severe penalties for offences com-
mitted by public officials and the establishment of co-ordinated sentencing policies for
each country as well as the provision of foreign investment as part of larger regional sup-
port programmes. 47
Despite these limitations, the Regulations do provide a valuable regional model which
may be revised and developed by particular countries to create their own system of appro-
priate controls specifically adjusted to reflect their existing laws, enforcement structures
and resources as well as their general state of economic and market development.
Although an important regional model has been created for the OAS area, however, the
most important determining factor of the ultimate success of any system of money laun-
dering controls will always be the content of the implementing measures adopted and the
degree to which they are properly enforced within each country.
In the following section, the provisions of the Money Laundering Direcitve are
reviewed as an alternative regional model for Europe. This is followed by a more detailed
examination of the content of the programme of measures established within the United
Kingdom as a possible implementation model for consideration by Latin American coun-
tries presently creating or revising their own money laundering controls.
IV. European Community Response: A Possible Model48
While a large amount of action in the area of financial crime has been taken at the
inter-governmental or inter-departmental level within Europe49 intervention by the
European Community as such has been limited to adopting single measures on money
laundering and insider dealing. 50 The main reason for this has been the disputed authori-
47. See Solomon, supra note 5, at 451-453.
48. Under Article G.A(1) of the Maastrict Treaty, all references in the Treaty of Rome to the
European Economic Treaty are to replaced by the references to the European Community. The
European Union is created under Article A of the Maastrict Treaty and additional powers con-
ferred on it in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article J) and Home Affairs
and Justice Policy (Article K). The Union is, however, founded on the European Communities,
that is the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community; Article A, para 3. The basic provisions with regard to the
European Single Market and, in particular, capital and financial services remain within the
renamed European Community Treaty, as amended by the Treaty Amending Certain Financial
Provisions, the Single European Act, the Merger Treaty, the Greenland Treaty, the Acts of
Accession and the Maastrict Treaty, references in this paper are to the European Community
and not to the European Union.
49. See, supra note 1 and supra section 4.1.
50. Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of The Financial
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Council Directive of 13 November 1989
coordinating regulations on insider dealing (89/592/EEC) OJ L334/30.
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ty of the Community in the criminal area 51
Although the measures adopted by the Community are modest in themselves, they are
important in that they oblige all Member States to adopt necessary implementation laws at
the national level. The effect is to create a minimum common response across Europe to
the difficulties identified. National implementation measures may also be in considerably
more stronger terms than the European Directives upon which they are based such is the
case of the United Kingdom's implementation of the Money Laundering Directive. 52
Following a review of the historical development of the money laundering response in
Europe, the principal provisions contained in the European Community Money
Laundering Directive are noted.
51. In connection with the authority of the Community in relation to criminal matters; see gener-
ally, Harris Criminal Sanctions under EC Law (1990) NEw LAW JOURNAL, 1323; and Dine
European Community Criminal Law? (1993) CRIM L REv 246. As a result of strong German
objections, the earlier proposal for a Directive on insider trading had to be amended only to
require that Member States shall determine appropriate penalties to be applied in respect of
infringements rather than criminal penalties; see final Article 13, Council Directive 89/592
coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ 1989 L334/30. Despite this, however the
European Court of Justice subsequently ruled on the validity of Council Regulation 3483/88
on control measures in the fisheries sector which had imposed an obligation on Member
States to adopt penal or administrative actions effectively to discourage violations under
Article 11(C)(1); see Council Regulation 343/88, OJ 1988 L306/2 adopted under Council
Regulation 2241187, O 1987 L207/1. On the basis of this ruling, the Legal Services of the
Commission and the Council had advised that the original terms of Article 2 of the Money
Laundering proposal were within the competence of the Community, although the upper
house of the German Parliament, the Bundesrat, still unreservedly rejected the original terms
of Article 2 despite its recognition of the Commission's efforts to control organised crime; see
Bundesrat, Drucksache 288/90 (Beschluss) adopted on its 616th Sitting of 6 July 1990, cited in
K.D. MagLiveras Money Laundering and the European Communities in Joseph J. Norton
(ed),Banks: Fraud and Crime, ch 9, at p.179. As a result, Article 2 was amended although sepa-
rate undertakings were taken from the Member States to ensure that the criminal provisions
would be adopted. Although Member States are also required to take appropriate measures in
respect of infringement under Article 14 of the Directive, restrictive provisions may still be
adopted under Article 15; see, Directive 91/308, op. cit. The limited nature of the Community's
intervention to these two specific instances of financial crime is, however, unfortunate in that
if a minimum programme of intervention in the area of financial crime was to be initiated it
should have considered all the possible issues of criminal prohibition, investigation and prose-
cution which arise. An attempt could have been made to formulate a coordinated financial
crime programme. Even though a number of important aspects of criminal investigation and
prosecution have been left to national determination or separate national or international
cooperation procedures, an integrated programme could still have been constructed which
could have been developed with these other initiatives in this area.
52. See, infra section 5.
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A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A package of five Resolutions had originally been adopted by the European
Parliament in September 1985 in connection with the setting up of a Committee of
Enquiry on "The Drug Problem" and "The Role that the Drug Trafficking Played in
Spreading Crime and Destabilising the Established Authority".53
The recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry were accepted by the Parliament
on 13 October 198654 in which the Council of Ministers was urged to adopt a resolution
on concerted action to tackle the drug problem. This was followed by a declaration being
issued by the Community's Justice Ministers on 30 October 1986 in which it was proposed
that practical guidelines should be established for freezing and confiscating the enormous
assets of drug traffickers in an effective fashion.
5 5
At the London Summit in December 1986, a seven-point action programme was
endorsed which included provisions for the prosecution of those involved in illegal nar-
cotics trade and for a system of drug asset confiscation which was to be applied through-
out the Community.5 6 The International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking
was then held in Vienna, Austria in June 1987, in which the Community actively partici-
pated. This led to the adoption of the Vienna Convention in December 1988. 57 The
Convention was concerned with, inter alia, criminalisation of the laundering of drug pro-
ceeds through the financial system and made a specific provision for the extradition of
money launderers, mutual legal assistance, the transfer of laundering proceeds, the lifting
of bank secrecy in criminal investigations and the confiscation of laundered property.58
Ratification of the Convention was concluded in October 1990.59
Following this, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling upon the
Commission to work together with national governments in connection with the develop-
ment of efficient measures to combat organised crime drastically.60 The G7 also separately
53. Resolutions of 13 September 1985 on action to combat drug abuse (OJ 1985 C 261/119; Bull
EC 9-1985 2.1.62); see generally, MagLiveras, supra note 50; and Michael Levi, Money
Laundering Legislation and Fraud in Norton, supra note 50, ch 3; see also, William Gilmore
and Charles A Intriago, International Money Laundering, (1992).
54. Resolution of 13 October 1986 on the drug problem, OJ 1986 C 283/76. For the report on the
proceedings see, OJ Annex 2/343. For a summary see, Bill EC 10/1986,2.4.17.
55. See, Bull EC 1011986, pp 75-78; see also Zagaris and Bornheim, International Cooperation
against Money Laundering in the European Integration Context, FIVE INTERNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT LAW REPORT, IELR 441, (1989).
56. See, Bull EC 12/1986, 1.1.18 The action programme had been adopted following the European
Council conclusion at the Hague Summit four months earlier that there was urgent need to
improve and intensify international collaboration in the area of drugs trafficking; see, Bull EC
6/1986 1.1.16.
57. See supra note 27.
58. See, arts. 6, 7, 8, 5(6) and 9.
59. See, Council Decision on the conclusion on behalf of the European Community of the Vienna
Convention, adopted on 22 October 1990 (90/611) OJ 1990 L 326/56.
60. See, Documents B3/1393, 1399, 1420 and 1436/91, OJ 1991 C 267/113; Bull EC 9-1991.1.2.134.
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set up the FATF at the Economic Summit in July 1989.61 The FATF was, in particular,
established to assess the results of the co-operation which had already been unofficially
undertaken between the participating states in order to prevent the utilisation of the bank-
ing system and of unsuspecting financial institutions for money laundering operations
and to come up with effective recommendations. 62
The FATF published its report in June 1990 which contained 40 recommendations
including a requirement that national criminal laws adopt a specific "money laundering"
offence, the development of the role of the banking system to prevent abuse by the money
laundering industry and the strengthening of international co-operation based on the facili-
tation of extradition of suspected criminals and proper ratification and implementation of
the Vienna Convention.63 At the meeting of EC Justice Ministers on 18 December 1990, the
possibility of agreeing on European anti-mafia legislation was discussed which included spe-
cial reference to banking institutions involved with money laundering and concluded that
financial centres have an increased responsibility in the fight against money laundering.64
Despite the importance of these international measures, it was considered essential
that a Community initiative was also undertaken in this area to ensure the soundness and
stability of the liberalised financial system within the Community.65 A proposal for a
money laundering Directive was accordingly issued by the Commission on 22 March
1990,66 which the European Parliament delivered its opinion in November 199067 and the
Economic and Social Committee [ESC] in September 1990.68
As a result of the amendments proposed by the Parliament and comments received
from the ESC, an amended proposal was issued on 30 November 1990.69 A Common
Position was arrived at by the Council under the co-operation procedure provided for in
Artide 149 of the Treaty on 14 February 1991.70 The Second Reading of the amended
proposal was given by the Parliament on 17 April 199171 after which the Directive was for-
mally adopted by the Council on 10 June 1991.72
61. See supra section 1 and note 11. This establishment of FATF was preceded by the Declaration
of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision on The fight against money laundering
through the banking system (the Declaration of Basle), 12 December 1988.
62. During the Paris Summit 7 more Member States with Australia agreed to join FATF in addi-
tion to the original signatories, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy.
63. For comment on the three subsequent annual reports, see MagLiveras, supra note 50, at 174.
64. See Conclusions of the Money Laundering Conference organised by the Council of Europe in
Strasbourg, September 1992, NL 92 (53) 6 October 1992, at p.2.
65. See Mr Jeffrey Fitchew, Director-General of DG XV (Financial Institutions and Company
Law), EC Commission, House of Lords Select Committee on the European Community's
Report of 4 December 1990, paras. 28-28-29 of the Written Evidence section.
66. COM (90) 106 Final, O 1990 C 106/6: [1990] 2 COMMON MARKET LAw REPoRTs, 411.
67. O 1990 C324/264.
68. OJ 1990 C332186.
69. COM (90) 593 Final, O 1990 C319/9.
70. Common Position adopted by the Council on 14 February 1991 with a view to adopting a
Council Directive on the prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering (4282/91).
71. EP DocA3-0082/91.
72. Council Directive 91/308 O 1991 L 166/77. For general comment on the original proposal see
report by the House of Lords of 4 December 1990, House of Lords Select Committee on
European Communities Session 1990-91, First Report on Money Laundering, HL Paper 6.
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B. EUROPEAN MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE
The basic purpose of the Directive is to prevent money laundering through the
exploitation of the Single Market in financial services which, in particular, involves the free
movement of capital within the Community73 and freedom to provide banking services
under the banking and financial services programme. 74 It is significant that the
Community did not attempt to deal with money laundering as an ancillary problem to
drug trafficking or organised crime, but as an integral part in the securing of the effective
operation of the Single Market in financial services.75
1. Objective
The principal objective of the Directive is to secure the standards and stability of cred-
it and financial institutions and confidence in the financial system as a whole which would
otherwise be seriously jeopardised through the activities of money launderers. 76 This
objective is to be achieved by ensuring that all Member States ensure that money launder-
ing as defined in the Directive is prohibited, 7 ' by the establishment of systems to ensure
that credit and financial institutions carry appropriate customer identification procedures
and keep adequate records of all suspicious transactions (which may be made available to
relevant authorities) 78 and by allowing Member States to extend the scope of the Directive
to all professions and entities involved in unregulated large cash transaction areas. 79
73. See, arts. 67-73 EEC Treaty and Council Directive.
74. See supra section 4.1.
75. For comment see, MagLiveras, supra note 50, at 175-176. The complete liberalisation of capital
transactions and the full integration of banking and other financial markets is, in particular,
seen as one of the principal features of Economic and Monetary Union under the draft Treaty
on Economic and Monetary Union which was signed on February 1992 and came into force
on 1 November 1993; see, Report of the Delors Committee for the study of EMU, Report on
EMU in the European Community, Luxembourg, (1989) at p.19. The free movement of capital
is an indispensable part of Stage I of EMU. Free movement of capital within the Community
was, in fact, secured on 1 July 1990 except with regard to Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal
which had to secure free movement of capital by December 1992. Greece and Portugal had
retained the right to postpone the complete liberalisation of capital movements until the end
of 1995, although Portugal secured full compliance in October, 1992.
76. Directive 91/308, Preamble 1.
77. See, art. which requires that money laundering is prohibited and separate protocols signed by
each of the Member States confirming that money laundering will be made a criminal offence;
see, supra note 50 and infra section 4.2(d).
78. Articles 3-11.
79. Article 12; such areas may include art dealers and dealers in precious stones and metals, real




The Directive applies to all credit institutions as defined under the First Banking
Directive80 and other financial institutions which consist of undertakings, other than cred-
it institutions, which carry on any of the additional activities listed in the Annex to the




Money laundering is defined under the Directive as including:
82
The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from
criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of con-
cealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is
involved in the commission of such an activity to evade the legal consequences of his
action;
The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, move-
ment, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity;
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that
such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity; and
Participating in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting,
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the forego-
ing paragraphs.
It is clear that the definition follows that contained in the FATF Report with an
express separate provision being added with regard to assistance and complicity.
83
Property includes assets of every kind, both corporeal and incorporeal, moveable or
immovable, tangible or intangible and documents or instruments evidencing title to or
interest in such assets.
84
Criminal activity includes any crime specified in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna
Convention and any other criminal activity designated as such for the purposes of the
Directive by each Member State.85 The difficulty which arises with regard to the definition
of criminal activity and the corresponding scope of the Directive is that its particular
application in each Member State is left to the discretion of the local authorities through
the designation of the appropriate criminal activity to be covered by the Directive. This is
80. Article 1 of Directive 77/780 as amended by Directive 89/646.
81. Annex 1, paras 2-12 of Directive 891646 and Directive 79/267 as last amended by Directive
90/619.
82. Article 1 of Directive 90/308 following Article 3(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
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particularly unfortunate, especially in light of the already limited degree of harmonisation
achieved in criminal matters within Europe.86
4. Prohibitions
Although the original proposal had required that Member States ensure that money
laundering was made a criminal offence, this had to be amended only to require that
money laundering be prohibited although separate undertakings were given by each of the
Member States to the effect that money laundering would be made a criminal offence by
31 December 1992.87
5. Identification Requirements
Member States are to ensure that credit and financial institutions require identifica-
tion of customers by means of supporting evidence when entering into business relations
especially when opening accounts, saving accounts or safe custody facilities. 88
Identification also applies with regard to any transaction involving a sum amounting to
ECU 15,000 or more whether carried out in a single operation or several linked transac-
tions.89
Identification is exempt, however, with regard to insurance policies where the periodic
premium is less than ECU 1,000 or where the single premium is less than ECU 2,500 and
in relation to occupational pension schemes.90 Where the real identity of the customer
may be in doubt, reasonable measures must be taken to confirm this and identification is
necessary in all cases where money laundering is suspected, whether the transaction is
below the listed threshold or not.91
The Directive also exempts from identification amounts received from another credit
or financial institution and direct debit transactions involving credit institutions already
subject to the terms of the Directive.92 Identification and transaction records are to be kept
for at least five years after the customer has left a particular institution or the execution of
86. For comment, see MagLiveras, supra note 50, at 178.
87. See, supra note 50. Although the Parliament had also amended Article 2 to provide for a confis-
cation obligation, this was rejected by the Council. Such an amendment would have extended
the scope of the Directive very considerably; see generally, Keyser-Ringnolda European
Integration with regard to the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, 17 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW,
499 (1992). Confiscation can, however, be achieved through various international treaties; see
for example, Convention on Laundering, Search Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of
Crime, open for signature on 8 November 1990 under the aegis of the Council of Europe, in
force since 1 September 1993, European Treaty Series ETS 141, 30 ILN 148 (1991).
88. Article 3(1). These requirements are referred to as "Know Your Customer" or KYC rules in the
United States. Following the introduction of suspicious transaction reporting requirements in
additional to fixed value transactional reporting obligations, most banks in the United States
have adopted KYC policies to assist in the identification of suspicious transactions. See infra
section 5.2 (b) and 5.3 (b) and section 6 and note 172.
89. Article 3(2).
90. Article 3(3) and (4).
91. Article 3(5) and (6).
92. Article 3(7) and (8).
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a transaction.93 Credit and financial institutions are also placed under a specific obliga-
tion to examine carefully all suspect transactions which may involve money laundering
activities. 94
6. Reporting Obligations
Any information which may indicate money laundering must be reported to the rele-
vant competent authorities by the directors and employees of credit or financial institu-
tions on their own initiative and all other necessary information provided at the request of
the authorities.95 Adequate procedures of internal control and communication must be
set up within all credit and financial institutions and all employees made aware of the
requirements of the Directive with regard to identification and reporting requirements.96
Any information supplied may only be used for the purposes of money laundering investi-
gation and prosecution. 97
Suspect transactions must not be effected until the relevant authorities have been
properly informed unless this would be impossible or frustrate efforts to pursue the bene-
ficiaries of the suspected operation.98 Credit and financial institutions and their directors
and employees are placed under a specific obligation not to inform their customers or any
third party that any information has been reported to the authorities or that a money
laundering investigation is being carried out.99 Disclosure in good faith under the terns of
the Directive is exempt from any liability for breach of disclosure of confidence. 100
Any other information discovered by competent authorities responsible for the regu-
lation or supervision of credit or financial institutions which indicates money laundering
must also be reported to the money laundering authorities. 10 1 The provisions of the
Directive may also be extended to apply to professions or other categories of undertakings,
in whole or in part, other than credit and financial institutions, which engage in activities
which may be used for money laundering purposes.10 2
7. Contact Committee
A Contact Committee was also set up to facilitate the harmonised implementation of
the Directive and consultation between Member States on more stringent or additional
conditions and obligations as well as to advise the Commission on any supplements or
amendments to the Directive and to examine whether the Directive should be extended to
any particular profession or category of undertaking.10 3 The Committee is not, however,
93. Article 4.
94. Article 5.
95. Article 6; para. 1.
96. Article 11 and Article 6, para. 2.
97. Article 6, para. 3.
98. Article 7.
99. Tipping; Article 8.
100. Article 9. This is very important in jurisdictions which maintain strict bank secrecy laws.
101. Article 10.
102. Article 12. See supra note 78.
103. Article 13(1).
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to be responsible for considering the merits of individual decisions taken by competent
authorities in particular cases. 104 The Committee is to be composed of persons appointed
by the Member States and of representatives of the Commission. 105
8. Implementation
Member States were required to take appropriate measures to ensure full application
of the provisions of the Directive especially with regard to penalties for infringement
although stricter provisions may be adopted or retained in force. 106 Implementation was
to have occurred by 1 January 1993 at the latest.107 The Commission was required to draw
up an implementation report on the Directive which must be updated every three years
and submitted to the European Parliament and Council for examination. 10 8
9. Comment
The Directive is dearly an important measure in the development of crime controls
against money laundering within the Community. The extension of the application of the
Directive to include all possible forms of criminal activity is particularly welcome;
although the discretion left to Member States' governments in this regard is unfortunate.
The identification requirements provided for in the Directive are clearly sound and
attempt to achieve a fair compromise between only reporting suspicious transactions as
provided for in Article 3(6) and the fifteen day reporting requirement in the United States
of any withdrawal or transfer of currency in excess of $10,000.109
Although the use of separate undertakings to secure the adoption of criminal penal-
ties across Europe was unfortunate, if such a procedure is to be used in connection with
the development of other areas of financial crime, the procedure might be formalised and
in this particular case, extended to include agreement on the range of criminal activities to
be covered under Article 1, professional and trade extensions of the Directive under Article
12, penalties under Article 14 and stricter provisions under Article 15. The lack of authori-
ty given to the Contact Committee set up under the Directive is also unfortunate and
should be subject to review.
Despite the limitations of particular provisions of the Directive, this is a significant
measure in the development of general regulatory and, in particular, criminal responses to




106. Articles 14 and 15.
107. Article 16(1). Member States were to communicate to the Commission the text of the main
provisions of national law which were adopted to implement the Directive for the purposes of
examination of compatibility. In the event of failure to adopt the particular Member State
may be brought before the European Court of Justice under Article 169 of the EC Treaty.
108. Article 17.
109. See infra note 172.
110. For a review of the most recent action proposed following the Madrid Summit in December
1995 see, Agence Europe, EU: Council indicates vast range of measures ro fight drug trafficking,
REUTERS TEXTLINE, January 10, 1996.
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IV. An Example of EC Implementation: The Case of the United Kingdom
The European Money Laundering Directive was implemented in the United Kingdom
by the Criminal justice Act 19911 by adding additional offenses to the Criminal Justice Act
198112 and by the issuance of separate Money Laundering Regulations in 1993113 While
the basic criminal offenses were created under the Criminal Justice Act 1993, the specific
requirements with regard to financial institutions contained in the Money Laundering
Directive were given effect to under the Money Laundering Regulations.
While there were existing Common Law offenses in England and Wales, and separate
offenses in Scotland, which covered money laundering activities before the adoption of the
1993 Criminal Justice Act,114 specific statutory provisions were introduced under the 1986
Drug Trafficking Offenses Act (DTOA 115 and the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism
111. Criminal Justice Act 1993, §§ 29-35.
112. Criminal Justice Act 1988, §§ 93A, 93B, 93C, 93D, 93E and 93F with further amendments
being made to sections 94 and 95.
13. Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993-1933. See, infra section 5.3.
114. Under the Theft Act 1968 in England and Wales, a range of offences are set out which include
the dishonest handling of stolen goods or the proceeds of stolen goods, such as blackmail and
property obtained by deception or fraud; see, Theft Act, §§ 13, 21 and 22. Under § 24(4) theft
is defined to indude blackmail and fraud.
115. Under § 24 of the DTOA, the offence of assisting another to retain the benefit of drug traffick-
ing is created which is defined to include the following:
(a) to enable a drug trafficker to retain or exercise control over the proceeds of drug traffick-
ing, by concealing them, removing them from the jurisdiction or transferring them to nomi-
nees; (b) to use the proceeds of drug trafficking in order to place funds at the disposal of the
drug trafficker; (c) to use such proceeds in order to acquire property by means of investing the
proceeds for the direct benefit of a drug trafficker. On summary conviction, the sentence may
include imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine up to the statutory maxi-
mum of E2,000 or both and, on indictment, a term of imprisonment not exceeding 14 years or
a fine or both.
Under § 24 (3) bank officials, investment and financial advisers and lawyers are exempt from
civil prosecution for breach of confidentiality. Persons who participate in money laundering
operations only to facilitate police investigations are also exempt from prosecution.
The money laundering offences created under the DTOA are extended by the Criminal Justice
(International Cooperation) Act 1990 [CJ(IC)] which was adopted following ratification by
the United Kingdom of the 1988 Vienna Convention. Under § 14(1) of the CJ(IC), it was
made a criminal offence for a person to conceal, disguise, convert or transfer the proceeds of
narcotics in order to avoid prosecution for a drug trafficking offence, while under § 14(2) it is
an offence for a person to carry out any of the activities listed in subsection (1), if he knows, or
has reasonable grounds to suspect, that such proceeds are another person's proceeds and if it
was done for the purpose of assisting such person to avoid prosecution for a drug trafficking
offence. Under § 14(3), it is also an offence to acquire another person's narcotics proceeds
from them or their inadequate consideration, if the person has knowledge, or reasonable
grounds to suspect, that the property concerned was criminal proceeds.
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(Temporary Provisions) Act 116 These particular offenses in connection with drug and ter-
rorist activities were extended under the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1993
The Criminal Justice Act 1993 received its Royal Assent on 27 July 1993 following the
publication of two consultative documents by Her Majesty's Treasury in May and
November 1992.117 The Act came into effect on 1 April 1994.
Under §§ 16-19 of Part II of the Criminal Justice Act, a number of amendments are
made to the DTOA 1986 which generally include expanding the existing offense and pro-
viding two additional defenses with regard to adequate consideration and knowing disclo-
sure. 118 A new offence is also created in connection with anyone who, acting in the course
of any trade, business or profession, becomes aware or suspects that another person is
engaged in money laundering operations 119 and of tipping-off suspected offenders. 120
The provisions with regard to money laundering and other offenses not involving
drug trafficking proceeds are contained in Part III of the Criminal Justice Act. Three spe-
cific offenses are created with regard to assisting, acquisition and concealment of criminal
proceeds and the offence of tipping-off.
1. Assistance
Under § 93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988,121 a person is guilty of an offence if he
enters into an arrangement to facilitate the retention or control of criminal proceeds,
whether by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise,
or to secure that the funds are placed at the other person's disposal or invested on his
behalf, in both cases knowing or suspecting that the person has been engaged in criminal
activities. Reference to the proceeds of criminal conduct include any property which, in
whole or part, directly or indirectly represent the proceeds of criminal conduct.122
116. § 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, made it a criminal
offence to facilitate another to retain or control terrorist funds which include moneys used to
further the commission of terrorist acts, proceeds from undertaking terrorist activities, such as
bank robberies or extortion, and financial resources which prescribed organisations enjoy; see
§ 11. The concealment, removal from the jurisdiction or transfer of funds to nominees is also
covered. Similar exemptions from the breach of duty of confidentiality and for assisting police
investigations are also provided. See, § 12.
117. Although it was stated in the May 1992 consultative paper that the British legislation was, to a
considerable extent, substantially in line with the provisions of the European Money
Laundering Directive, primary and secondary legislation would be adopted to elaborate and
extend the existing law; see HM Treasury, Implementation of the EEC Money Laundering
Directive, May 1992, paragraph 7. The second consultative paper was concerned with the
adoption of appropriate Money Laundering Regulations; see, HM Treasury, The Money
Laundering Regulations, November 1992; and see, § 5.2 below.
118. § 23A(2),23A(7).
119. § 26B of the DTOA, inserted by § 18 of the CJA.
120. § 26C.
121. Inserted by § 29(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.
122. § 93A (2).
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A person is not, however, guilty of an offence if he can establish that he did not know
or suspect that the arrangement related to any person's proceeds of criminal conduct or
that the arrangement facilitated the retention or control of the criminal proceeds. 123 It is
also a defence if the person intended to disclose his suspicions to a constable but had rea-
sonable excuse for failing to do so. 124 A person disclosing their suspicion or belief that
funds or investments may be invested with criminal activities are exempt from any breach
of confidentiality obligations and from prosecution under the Act if the act was done with
the consent of a constable or notified to a constable as soon as reasonably possible. 125 A
person is also guilty of an offence if he acquires, uses or possesses property belonging to
another, knowing that the property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represents
the proceeds of criminal conduct. 126 It is, however, a defence to establish that the property
was acquired for adequate consideration. 12 7
2. Concealment
It is also an offence to conceal or disguise property derived from criminal proceeds or
convert or transfer that property or remove it from the jurisdiction for the purpose of
avoiding prosecution under the Act 128 or to assist another person in doing so. 129
In all cases, a person guilty of an offence is liable on summary conviction, to impris-
onment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maxi-
mum or both, or, on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years
or a fine or both. 130
3. Tipping
With regard to tipping-off, a person is guilty of an offence if he knows or suspects that
a money laundering investigation is being conducted and notifies any other person to the
prejudice of the investigation. 131 Tipping-off of any disclosure to the authorities or to an
employer is also prohibited.132
B. THE MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS 1993
The Money Laundering Regulations were published on 28 July 1993 following a
Consultative Paper from HM Treasury in November 1992.133 The Regulations give effect
123. § 93A(4)(a) and (b).124. § 93(0)(c).
125. § 93(4)(c).
126. § 93B(1).
127. § 93B(2).128. § 93C(1).
129. § 93C(2).
130. § 93A(6),93B(9) and 93C(4).
131. § 93D(!).
132. § 93D(2) and (3).
133. Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1933 made under the European Communities
Act 1972 § 2(2).
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to the identification and reporting requirements contained in the European Community
Money Laundering Directive. The Regulations came into effect on 1 April 1994.
1. Financial Business
The Regulations apply to all relevant financial business which includes deposit-taking
businesses authorised in the United Kingdom or elsewhere within the Community, build-
ing societies, investment businesses, any of the other activities referred to in the Annex to
the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive134 and insurance business. 135
Where business relationships are foreign or only a one-off transaction is carried out,
in the course of a relevant financial business, the persons carrying on that business are
required under the regulations to maintain proper identification, record-keeping and
internal control and communications procedures for the purposes of preventing money
laundering. 136 Such persons must also ensure that all employees are aware of the relevant
procedures and money laundering laws as well as properly trained in the recognition and
handling of money laundering transactions. 137
Any person who fails to maintain appropriate procedures or carry out the required
training is guilty of an offence. 138 Where the offence is committed by a body corporate,
partnership or unincorporated association, any director, manager, secretary or other simi-
lar officer shall also be guilty of the offence and subject to prosecution.' 39
2. Identification Requirements
Except where an appropriate exemption is available, satisfactory evidence of the iden-
tity of an applicant for business must be obtained in each of four specific case circum-
stances.140 Case one applies where the parties form or resolve to form a business relation-
134. These include: acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; lending;
financial leasing; money transmission services; issuing and administering means of payment(e.g. credit cards, travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts); guarantees and cofimitments; trad-
ing for own account or for account of customers in (a) money market instruments (cheques,
bills, CDs etc), (b) foreign exchange,(c) financial futures and options,(d) exchange and inter-
est rate instruments, (e) transferable securities; participation in share issues and the provision
of services related to such issues; advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strate-
gy and related questions and advice and services relating to mergers and the purchase of
undertakings; money broking; portfolio management and advice; safekeeping and administra-
tion of securities; credit reference services; and safe custody services. See, Second Council
Directive 89/646/EEC on the Co-ordination of laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 1998
(OJ L 386,30.12.89, 1).
135. Money Laundering Regulations, para. 4(1). The Regulations exclude societies registered under
the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, the Bank of England and those exempt under
§ 45 of the Financial Services Act 1986 (Miscellaneous Exemptions for holders of certain judi-
cial and other offices). Id, para. 4(2).
136. Id, Regulation 5(1)(a).
137. Regulation 5(1)(b) and (c).
138. Regulation 5(2).
139. Regulation 6(1).
140. Regulation 7(1). See supra note 87.
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ship between them. Case two applies in any circumstance where, in respect of any one-off
transactions, any person handling the transaction knows or suspects that the applicant for
business is engaged in money laundering or that the transaction is carried out on behalf of
another person engaged in money laundering. Case three applies to any one-off transac-
tions involving payment by or to the applicant for business in excess of ECU15,000. Case
four applies where it is clear at the outset, or at any later stage, that two or more transac-
tions are linked and that the total amount involved is in excess of ECU15,000.
3. Agency Relationships
Where an applicant for business is, or appears to be, acting otherwise than as princi-
pal, reasonable measures must be taken to establish the identity of the person for whom
the applicant proposes to be acting. 14 1 What constitutes a reasonable measure in any par-
ticular case will depend on all of the circumstances and, in particular, the best practice fol-
lowed at the time in the relevant field of activity.142
It is, however, sufficient for the person making the application for the business to pro-
vide a written assurance that the proper identity of the person for whom he is acting has
been obtained and recorded under his own procedures. 143 Payment from a bank or building
society account may be acceptable evidence of a person's identity where it is reasonable for
the payment to be made by post, telephone or any other electronic means of transferl"
4. Exemptions
Compliance with the Regulations is not required where the applicant for business is
already bound by the provisions of the Regulations, where the applicant for business is
already covered by the Money Laundering Directive, one-off introductions in connection
with which adequate identification and record procedures are already maintained, cases
involving reinvestment of the funds involved, occupational pension schemes, insurance
premia of not less than ECU2,500 and annual insurance business where the total payable
in any one calendar year does not exceed ECU1,000.145
Evidence of identity is satisfactory if it is reasonably capable of establishing that the
applicant is the person he claims to be and the person who obtains the evidence is satisfied
that the applicant's identity is properly established in accordance with the procedures
maintained under the Regulations. 146 Whether the identity of the applicant is satisfied
within a reasonable time will depend upon the nature of the business relationship or one-
off transaction concerned, the geographical location of the parties and whether it is practi-
cal to obtain the evidence before commitments are entered into between the parties or
money passes and the earliest stage at which it is reasonable to believe that the total
amount of business involved is ECU15,000 or more.1 47
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5. Records
Records of all identification evidence obtained and of all transactions with applica-
tions for business must be kept for a period of at least five years from the date on which
either the relevant business was completed or the final transaction in a series of activities
was completed.148
6. Reporting Procedures
Each relevant financial business must ensure that it has adequate internal reporting
procedures which require that a person is identified as the person to whom all reports are
to be made of any information that gives rise to the knowledge or suspicion that money
laundering was taking place, that such reports are properly considered on available infor-
mation and that appropriate reports are made to the police. 149
All supervisory authorities are also required to obtain all necessary information
indicative of money laundering and to make an appropriate report to the police. 150
Inspectors and certain other persons who work with supervisory authorities under specific
statutory provisions are also required to report any such information to the relevant super-
visory authority or the police. 151
C. MONEY LAUNDERING GUIDANCE NOTES
A joint Money Laundering Steering Group was subsequently established to assist in the
development of appropriate practices for United Kingdom financial institutions to secure
proper compliance with the requirements of the relevant money laundering legislation.152
The Steering Group produced a first set of Money Laundering Guidance Notes for
Banks and Building Societies in December 1990. These were revised in October 1993 to
accommodate the European Money Laundering Directive and United Kingdom implement-
ing measures under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and the Money Laundering Regulations
1993. A revised set of Guidance Notes was issued in February 1995 following revision of the
Notes in light of the experience and additional clarification which was provided on the basis
of enquiries and comments received from banks and other financial institutions.
148. Regulation 12.
149. Regulation 14.
150. Regulation 16. The relevant supervisory authorities involved are set out in Regulation 15(2).
151. Regulation 16(3) and (6).
152. The work of the Steering Group is carried on through four committees: Mainstream Banking
Sub-Committee, Investment Sub-Committee, Insurance Sub-Committee and Education and
Training Sub-Committee. The Steering Group is made up of representatives of the
Association of British Insurers, the Association of Private Client Investment Managers and
Stockbrokers, Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds, British Bankers' Association,
Foreign Banking and Securities Houses' Association, IFA Association, Institutional Fund
Managers' Association, London Investment Banking Association, National Criminal
Intelligence Service, Society of Pension Consultants and Wholesale Market Brokers'
Association.
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Four final sets of Guidance Notes are now available for Mainstream Banking, Lending
and Deposit Taking Activities (the Red Book), Insurance and Retail Investment Products
(the Green Book), Wholesale, Institutional and Private Client Investment Business (the
Yellow Book) and Receiving Bankers (the Blue Book).
The explanatory Foreword to the Notes states that the guidance given only illustrates
good industry practice and is not mandatory. To this extent, failure to comply with the
Guidance Notes will not mean that a financial institution has automatically breached the
regulations, although it may be necessary to demonstrate the adequacy of any alternative
procedures adopted.
Each of the sets of Guidance Notes contains background information, an outline of
the relevant United Kingdom law, notes on internal controls policies and procedures, iden-
tification procedures, record keeping, recognition and reporting of suspicious transactions
as well as additional provisions on education and training.
1. Internal Controls
With regard to internal controls, and policies and procedures, the Regulations recom-
mend that all banks and building societies introduce procedures for the prompt validation
of suspicions and subsequent reporting to the national Criminal Intelligence Service,
appoint a Money Laundering Reporting Officer who has access to all relevant systems and
records and establish close co-operation and liaison with the relevant law enforcement
agencies. 153
The roles of Prevention Officer and the Reporting Officer may be combined depend-
ing on the scale and nature of the business. As a matter of good practice, policy procedure
and control compliance should be verified on a regular basis which arrangements may be
undertaken by the internal audit or compliance departments in larger institutions. 154
Although the Regulations recognise that there is a statutory obligation to establish and
maintain procedures for the purpose of deterring and recognising money laundering in
the ordinary course of business, it is noted that this does not require financial institutions
to install specific systems to detect money laundering activities.155
2. Identification Procedures
In connection with identification procedures, it is noted that the requirement to verify
identity is not retrospective and only applies to new one-off transactions and business
relationships.156 Despite the availability of exceptions under Regulations 7, 8 and 10 of the
Money Laundering Regulations, it is noted that customer identity must be verified in all
cases where money laundering is known or suspected and that the details be reported in
compliance with the relevant procedures.157
153. Part III, para. 33.
154. Id., para. 35.
155. Id., para. 36.
156. Part IV, para. 39.
157. Id., para. 42.
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The Guidance Notes contain detailed provisions with regard to the maintenance and
operation of appropriate identification procedures. 158 This was considered necessary as
the Regulations do not specify what may or may not represent adequate evidence of identi-
ty. The Notes contain a number of specific recommendations with regard to account open-
ing procedures for UK resident and non-UK resident customers, dubs, societies and chari-
ties, unincorporated businesses, trust nominee and fiduciary accounts, accounts opened by
intermediaries and UK and non-UK registered companies.159 The Notes also make cer-
tain recommendations with regard to the verification of other regulated credit and finan-
cial institutions, the acceptance of wholesale sterling and foreign currency deposits and the
provision of safe custody and safety deposit boxes. 160
As the Regulations do not specify what constitutes satisfactory supporting evidence of
customer identification enquiries, certain recommendations are also made to ensure that
the investigating authorities are able to compile a satisfactory audit trail for suspected
laundered money and to establish a financial profile of any particular suspect account.
Transaction information should include the beneficial owner of the account, the volume of
funds flowing through the account and, in connection with selected transactions, the ori-
gin of the funds, the form in which the funds were offered or withdrawn, the identity of
the person undertaking the transaction, the destination of the funds and form of instruc-
tion and authority. 161
It is, however, recognised that some prioritisation of record keeping is acceptable as it
is unrealistic to require copies of all material to be maintained indefinitely. Although the
principal objective must retrieve relevant information to the extent that it is available with-
out undue delay. 162 Where on-going investigations are involved, records should be
retained until it is confirmed by the.relevant law enforcement agency that the particular
case has been closed. 163
3. Records
Record retention may be by way of original document, or some form of microfiche,
computerised or electronic filing system. Although the Regulations do not require that
original documents are retained, if original vouchers are available it is noted that their
retention would be of assistance to law enforcement agencies for at least one year to assist
forensic analysis.164
With regard to computer generated records, a certification procedure has to be com-
plied with under s 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which will involve, in
particular, either oral evidence or the tendering of a written certificate in accordance with









the requirements of the Act. 165 Documents may also be proved by the production of an
enlargement of the microfilm copy of the document, or of a material part of it, authenti-
cated in such manner as a court may approve. 166
With regard to wire transfer transactions, SWIFT now requires that all systems users
ensure that when sending SWIFT NTI00 messages, that is customer transfers, the fields for
the ordering and beneficiary customers should be completed with the respective names and
addresses. Subject to any technical limitations, ordering customers should be encouraged to
include such information in all domestic or international credit transfers in connection with
all electronic payment or message systems. Where this is not done, full records of the order-
ing customer and the address should be retained by the originating financial institutions. 167
4. Reporting
With regard to the recognition and reporting of suspicious transactions, it is noted
that a suspicious transaction will generally be one which is inconsistent with a customer's
known legitimate business or personal activities or with the normal business for the par-
ticular type of account involved. A number of examples of suspicious transactions are set
out in Appendix G to the Notes with additional guidance concerning the reporting of sus-
picious transactions. 168 The reception point for disclosure of suspicious transactions in
165. Information as to the authentication of computerised records is set out in Appendix F of the
Guidance Notes; see, para. 119 and Appendix F A written certificate of authentication of com-
puterised records must be in accordance with the terms of paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 to the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Such a certificate must, in particular, identify the doc-
ument containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced, give
particulars of any production device, such as a printer model, note that there are no reason-
able grounds for believing that the statement is inaccurate because of improper use or unau-
thorised access, and be signed by an appropriate officer of the company. A statement or docu-
ment may also be admissible in criminal proceedings as evidence of any fact in connection
with which direct oral evidence would be admissible if the document was created or received
by a person during the course of a trade, business profession or other occupation or as the
holder of a paid or unpaid office and the information was supplied by a person who had, or
may reasonably be, supposed to have had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with; see, §
24 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
166. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
167. Paras. 121-123.
168. Section VI, paras. 124-146 and Appendix G. The examples provided include the following with
regard to cash transactions: unusually large cash deposits, substantial increases in cash
deposits, the use of numerous credit slips, unusual forms of commercial payment, frequent
cash deposits to cover transfer payments, high volumes of low denomination notes and the
frequent exchange of cash into other currencies, unusually high branch balances, counterfeit
notes and forged instruments, foreign payments being settled in cash and large cash deposits
using nightsafe facilities. Other examples are provided with regard to the use of bank or
building society accounts, investment related transactions, offshore international activities,
financial institutions employees and agents and secured and unsecured lending. A number of
specific money laundering schemes uncovered are also set out in Appendix A which include
account opening with drafts, bank deposits and international transfers, bogus property com-
panies, theft of company funds, Jersey deposits and sham loans, the Cocaine Lab Case, curren-
cy exchange, cash deposits and bank complicity; see Appendix A, paras. 1-10.
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the United Kingdom is the Economic Crime Unit (Financial Desk of the National
Criminal Intelligence Service).
The Guidance Notes are clearly of value ensuring that all principal forms of financial
institutions maintain effective internal control and reporting procedures to ensure that
they comply with all of the relevant European and detailed United Kingdom implementa-
tion requirements in this area. The Notes will also be of indirect use in advising or, at least,
reminding certain institutions of their proper responsibilities and potential liabilities in
this area.
There are, however, as yet, no effective supervision or enforcement mechanisms in
connection with compliance and it is unclear whether United Kingdom financial institu-
tions are taking the Notes as seriously as banking compliance programmes are in the
United States, especially in the absence of the same judicial support for the legislative ini-
tiatives adopted in the States.169
It is dearly essential that at all stages in the development of national money launder-
ing control laws, that all relevant financial institutions establish adequate internal compli-
ance programmes. In connection with this, it is also clear that one very effective way to
achieve this result is to use separate secondary legislation to establish the basic require-
ments to be imposed on financial intermediaries and then to expand the content of these
provisions through non-enforceable guidance notes as the United Kingdom has done with
the Notes issued by its joint Money Laundering Steering Group. The use of this tripartite
system of initial statutory prohibition with more detailed secondary legislative require-
ments and then the separate preparation and issuance of separate guidance notes to assist
financial intermediaries develop appropriate internal compliance programmes is obviously
an efficient but cost effective way to proceed.
Even if a number of Latin American countries do not have the financial or personnel
resources to implement a control system based on the full United States model, they could
begin to develop, at least, an adequate minimum level of control through this simple three
part model which ultimately relies on the development of effective internal institutional
identification and reporting requirements.
V. A Note on the United States Response.
In the United States, a very detailed and extensive programme of statutory require-
ments has been constructed with regard to financial market regulation generally and eco-
nomic crime specifically. Federal authorities have also traditionally been able to adopt a
wide range of prosecutory actions in response to all forms of financial crime generally and
against money launderers, in particular, through both criminal statutes and the develop-
ment of various express and implied causes of action under civil statutes as well as through
various civil administrative and enforcement remedies. 170
169. For an excellent note on the content and importance of comparable United States codes of
conduct see, Frank C. Razzano, American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a World-
Wide System of Banking Compliance Programs, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACrICE
277, (1994).
170. See generally, Paul E. Coggins and Joseph I. Norton, The Regulators Response to Bank Fraud the
United State's Perspective, in Norton (ed), Banks: Fraud and Crime (1990), Ch 4.
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A number of important revisions have also been made to the operation of these basic
provisions within the last year. These include new Bank Secrecy Act 17 1 [BSA] reporting
requirements and revised suspicious transaction reporting obligations under the Money
Laundering Forfeiture Law 172 [MCLA]. There have also been a number of important for-
feiture and comity decisions taken by the United States courts.
173
Of more important current interest, however, is the anticipated effect of the Clinton
Administration's recent high profile proposals to combat money laundering contained in a
speech by the President on October 22 1995 to the United Nations following an outline of
the policy in a classified executive order of the previous day.1
74
Under this Presidential Decision Directive 42, government agencies are to be required to
identify Colombian drug traffickers, their associates and front companies, and to freeze all of
their assets in the United States. 175 Government agencies are also to collect evidence about
additional major international criminal organisations which may include Russian organised
crime groups.' 76 The most flagrant overseas sanctuaries for illegally obtained money are
171. FinCEN published an extensive list of proposed amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act regula-
tions in November, 1995. These include the revision of certain definitions to extend the appli-
cation of the Act to include, in particular, to securities firms; to require firms to comply with
new customer identification procedures, record-keeping and related training programmes; to
delegate authority to relevant federal banking agencies authority to impose civil penalties for
breach of BSA requirements; introduce new registration procedures for certain businesses
which transmit money; exempt certain transactions from existing CTR reporting require-
ments; and require reporting of cross-border transfers of certain types of financial instru-
ments in addition to cash payments. See US Treasury-FinCEN 1996 Regulatory Agenda, 60
Fed. Reg. 60, 452 (1995); see also, Treasury and FinCEN Issue Agendas For Fiscal year 1996
Regulatory Action, BNA Banking Daily, Dec 1, 1995. FinCEN is also expected to finalise in
early course the new United States know your customer or KYC rules for suspicious transac-
tions identification and reporting; see supra note 87. For comment on the need to improve the
collection and use of reported information see, United States General Accounting Office,
Money Laundering - Needed Improvements For Reporting Suspicious Transactions Are Planned,
Report to the Ranking Minority Member Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Committee on Governmental Affairs.
172. The new provisions include enhanced suspicious transaction reporting requirements, amend-
ments to the record-keeping for funds transfers and transmittals regulations and special direc-
tives in connection with designated narcotics traffickers (SDNTs). See, for example, FinCEN, Fed,
OCC Publish Suspicious Activities Final Rule, BNA Banking Daily, Feb 6, 1996 and FDIC OTS
Simplify Rules For Reporting Financial Crimes and Suspicious Activities, BNA Banking Daily, 1996;
58 Fed. Reg. 46,014 (1993); and Department of the Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, List
of Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,582 (1995), 60 Fed. Reg. 61,288
(1995) and 61 Fed. Reg. 9,523 (1996).
173. For general comment on recent developments in the United States see Kelly, Jr., supra note 19;
and Prepared Statement by Jayetta Z Hecker, Associate Director of International Relations and
Trade Issues, Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. Efforts to
Combat Money Laundering Overseas (1996).
174. See supra note 24. For a review and assessment of the certification programme see,
International Narcotics Control Efforts in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch,
vol. 6, n. 16 (Apr. 17, 1995); and U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Assessment of US
Counternarcotics Efforts in Asia, vol. 6, n. 32 (Aug. 7, 1995).
175. For a critical comment of the measures see, David Ignatious, supra note 24.
176. In connection with the recent developments in Russia see, supra note 4.
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identified and negotiations to be commenced with regard to ending their safe haven
status. 
1 77
In connection with the individuals targeted, , list of eighty (80) names has been pre-
pared which includes four (4) drug barons, forty-three (43) associates and thirty-three
(33) businesses. United States banks and financial institutions involved with the persons
listed are required to monitor all account records, wire transfers and other data to identify
any assets or transactions involving the named parties. It is expected that as a result of
these measures some $300 billion in drugs receipts will be transferred to the United
Kingdom and Europe for money laundering purposes.
While the United States authorities have been able to develop a substantial pro-
gramme of measures to combat the development of the laundering of financial proceeds
with the assistance of the legislature and courts, it remains to be seen what impact PDD-42
will have in this regard. The effect or threat of local seizure will clearly compel criminal
organisations to remove their funds and laundering operations from the United States to
other more amenable territories. This will reduce the total amount of criminal proceeds
laundered in the United States, although the status of the funds may simply be legitimised
elsewhere with no reduction in the total amount of global money involved.
Although it was dearly the Administration's intention to dose the gaps in the interna-
tional control of money laundering activities, in the absence of international agreement on
the specific measures to be adopted, the effect will simply be to transfer the problems experi-
enced in the United States to the other principal or more minor financial centres concerned.
Once the funds have been laundered elsewhere, however, it has to be expected that they may
then simply return to the originating criminal organisations involved in the United States.
Rather than deny criminal organisations the use of the laundered proceeds which
could otherwise have been traced by regulatory agencies within the United States through
the extensive filing requirements imposed, the recent proposals may simply delay or post-
pone the laundering process, but to do so in such a way that the authorities concerned will
not be able to take any subsequent action against the parties involved.
177. Approximately 50 money laundering centres were listed which included the British depen-
dent territories of Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands, the Bahamas and Aruba.
Determinations on the status of a large number of territories in terms of their commitment
to take adequate steps on their own or in co-operation with the United States to implement
the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances had already been issued in February 1995; see,
Presidential Determination No. 95-15, Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 46; 60 FR 12859. A
revised Presidential Determination 96-13 was subsequently issued on 1 March 1996; see,
Presidential Determination No. 96-13, Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 48; FR 9891.
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Although directed at territories which do not support international efforts to control
laundering activities, it has to be hoped that the recent measures will not simply export the
problems involved to countries which do not have the resources, experience or political
will to respond to the problems identified adequately. In such a case, the total volume of
global proceeds laundered would simply remain the same but be processed through terri-
tories where United States enforcement officers would not be able to effect any control. In
the absence of a complete set of effective bilateral or multi-lateral information, investiga-
tion and extradition arrangements between all of the countries concerned, the total global
effect may be significantly to increase rather than decrease the difficulties which arise in
controlling national and international money laundering activities. 178
VI. Conclusions
A considerable amount of work has clearly been undertaken within the OAS and
Europe in connection with the development of appropriate prohibitions on the laundering
of criminal proceeds through the new global financial markets of the 1990s.
The OAS has created a very useful regional control model in the area of money laun-
dering, although it is limited particularly in terms of enforceability, scope of application,
information exchange and content of internal compliance programmes.
As a national or implementation model, the United States has developed a very sub-
stantial arsenal of criminal and civil statutory and judicial sanctions against all types of
laundering. activity. While the onerous filing requirements imposed have proven to be of
value in the investigation and securing of prosecutions in a large number of instances, it
has to be hoped that the recent efforts in this area to make more co-ordinated and efficient
use of the results obtained may be of value. The more recent suspicious transaction report-
ing requirements and new KYC rules will also have a significant impact on the control of
laundering activities in the United States. It is important, however, that the costs imposed
on legitimate business and financial markets should not be completely uncontrolled.
178. For comment on recent developments in connection with the conclusion of appropriate inter-
national memoranda of understanding and similar arrangements see, Hecker, supra note 174.
For a note of the success of earlier Kerry Agreements following enactment by Congress of the
1988 Kerry Amendment which required the Treasury Department to negotiate bilateral agree-
ments with countries suspected of laundering large sums of proceeds from illicit drug sales in
the United States. See Solomon, supra note 5, at 442-444.
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The recent initiatives within the European Community in this area have also been
impressive especially insofar as they have created a significant common response across the
whole of Europe to the very serious threats created by money laundering activities in mod-
em financial markets.
Of substantially more importance, however, are the detailed implementation pro-
grammes adopted in the Member States of the Community and, in particular, within the
United Kingdom. Again, however, the criminal sanctions imposed are of no use without
rigorous and effective enforcement within the United Kingdom while appropriate systems
must be established to ensure that the Guidance Notes developed are fully implemented
and complied with by all financial institutions as part of their internal compliance proce-
dures. Despite these limitations the implementation measures adopted within the United
Kingdom may provide some assistance as an alternative implementation model for use by
other countries and especially those in Latin America in the creation, or revision, of effec-
tive local money laundering control provisions.
It is, however, still unclear whether a European/United Kingdom suspicious transac-
tions only or the more comprehensive United States full disclosure and suspicious transac-
tion model is more appropriate and effective in practice. Against the disadvantages of the
cost and administrative inconvenience involved, the United States model does provide a
powerful prosecutory tool and will consequently be of considerably more deterrent effect.
The European United Kingdom suspicious transaction model is more administratively
efficient although it places a higher investigatory burden on financial institutions them-
selves with arguably less deterrent value and less certain results in practice.
It is nevertheless still questionable to what extent the full United States model is
appropriate for immediate adoption in developing or less developed countries in light of
the sophisticated level of financial market development assumed and the onerous internal
investigation and reporting costs imposed on financial institutions as well as high degree
of public investigatory and enforcement resources required. In selecting a suitable imple-
mentation model for less developed economies, it is necessary to consider the competitive
effects of imposing onerous burdens on the development of the local financial industry
and economy generally. While a sufficient degree of control on abuse must be introduced
and maintained, this does not necessarily have to involve imposing the costs of a full
United States model on all other territories.
In terms of deterrence and redress, in addition to the continued development of
appropriate criminal and civil sanctions for active participation and knowing complicity,
the most effective response must be seizure and confiscature of all effected assets. As well
as closing existing laundering opportunities, this will, over time, deny criminal operations
of their illegitimate income. The United States has taken a clear legislative and judicial lead
in this area which it has to be hoped that all other countries will follow.
With regard to future developments, internal industry compliance programmes and
codes of conduct must be introduced or extended in all countries and a complete network
of comprehensive mutual legal assistance treaties constructed at the international level. All
remaining bank secrecy or confidentiality laws which prevent the detection and investiga-
tion of illegitimate laundering operations must also be removed.
The residual area of very considerable difficulty which remains, however, is the exis-
tence and continued expansion of wide-spread and very deep-rooted corruption in many
parts of the world. In the absence of responsible and judicious legal development and
committed law enforcement in all countries in support of the proper operation and con-
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tinued development of legitimate financial markets as well as of legitimate democratic
processes generally, any measures adopted to control money laundering or any other forms
of financial crime must ultimately be unsuccessful.
Although the United States PDD 42 will place a considerable amount of pressure on
territories which until now have not supported international efforts to control money
laundering activities, in particular, following the earlier PD 95-15 and subsequent PD 96-
13, it must be hoped that this does not backfire and simply result in the export of criminal
proceeds from the United States with their subsequent import in the form of legitimate
income streams, or other assets, with United States officials not being able to trace and pre-
vent their receipt by the original criminal organisations involved.
While a great deal of important work has been done to date, these efforts must continue
until a complete and effective programme of integrated national and international civil,
criminal and administrative measures is developed to prevent the abuse of the global finan-
cial system for the purposes of legitimising illegally obtained funds. Insofar as it remains pos-
sible to launder such funds, criminal organisations will be able to protect their accumulated
wealth and continue to develop their nefarious activities in all parts of the world.
Latin America must follow the lead established by other countries, although dearly
their efforts must take into account the realties of local market conditions and available
resources. The Latin American countries must, however, accept their responsibilities in this
area and properly participate in the development of a complete and integrated response to
the very serious threats created to the stability and continued growth of all national and
international markets though the abuse of legitimate financial operations for the conceal-
ment and protection of criminal wealth.
